PYLKINGTON'S CASE AND

ITS SUCCESSORS

At Easter Term in the Thirty-third year of the reign
of Henry the Sixth (I454-55) a novel case was brought before the Judge's sitting in the Exchequer Chamber.' It
was the year of the first battle of St. Albans and the factions of the red and white roses were engaged in a saguinary
struggle for the custody of the incompetent monarch, but
the courts sat undisturbed at Westminster listening to arguments and giving judgment as unconcernedly as in happier
times. Chief Justice Fortescue presented the facts. By a
special act of Parliament passed at a session in the spring
of 1450, John Pylkington was required to appear on a charge
of rape. Pylkington did not obey but, when taken prisoner
and incarcerated in the King's Bench prison in the custody
of the Marshall, appeared by counsel to attack the validity
of the act, showing that the bill, as it passed the Commons,
required "that the said John surrender himself before the
feast of Pentecost next ensuing," while, as it passed the
Lords, he was to appear "before the feast of Pentecost
which shall be in 1451." It was argued that "because the
Lords granted a longer day than was granted by the Commons, in which case the Commons ought to have the bill
returned to them and assent to the grant of the Lords but
it was not so; wherefore the act seems void." The court
then sent for Kirkby, the Master of the Rolls and Fauxes,
the clerk of Parliament to get their opinion on the Parliamentary procedure, which was explained at length by
Kirkby who thought the act was not good. Fauxes, however, narrated the circumstances that led to the seeming
discrepancy. According to his account the bill was introduced in the Commons after the feast of the Pentecost in
1450 with the intention that the proclamation should last
until the feast of the Pentecost next ensuing, but because
.at that time every act was dated as of the first day of the
I Y. B. 33 Hen. VI, I7, p1. 8.
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session the Lords inserted 1451 to make the bill conform
to its true intent. Chief Baron Illingsworth 2 and Mr. Justice Markham thought the act invalid as it appeared in the
file, and Markham added a criticism of the legislative methods. "Truly this is a perilous thing: for the court of Parliament is the highest court that the King has, and indeed
for every manner of thing or act that is material and done
there, the reason should be enrolled." Chief Justice Fortescue said: "This is an Act of Parliament and we wish to
be well advised before we annul any act made in Parliament
and peradventure the matter should wait until the next
Parliament, until we can be certified by them of the certainty of the matter."
The case was taken under advisement and no final
judgment is reported. In fact, upon the precise point involved, that is, whether informalities in the final agreement of both houses will vitiate a statute, no decision of a
*British court has ever been obtained, although in two
modem instances irregularities of this character have been
corrected by declaratory legislation. 3 But the larger question, whether an act, purporting to have received the assent
of King, Lords and Commons, duly enrolled in Parliament
and Chancery is conclusive upon the courts, apparently
first mooted in this case, has troubled. the courts of the
New World, undiscovered when Pylkington's fate was left
hanging in the balance by a reporter more interested in law
than in results. One may wonder, indeed, what turn the
learned Chief Justice, author of De Landibus Legum Angliae, would have given to his remarks had he realized that
the case would be cited as a precedent four hundred and
fifty years later.
In Great Britain Parliament is supreme and the courts
are not competent to go behind its enactments. "An act
of Parliament," said Lord Chief Justice Holt, "can do no
2He is so described in the case but Foss says he was not Chief Baron

until

1462.

3Hardcastle believes the case would be followed, Statutory Law (3 ed.).
(12 ed. 402).

See also May's Parliamentary Practice
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wrong though it may do several things that look pretty
odd."
"We sit here," said Mr. Justice Willes, "as servants of the Queen and the legislature. Are we to act as
regents over what is done by Parliament with the consent
of the Queen, Lords and Commons? I deny that any such
authority exists. If an act of Parliament has been obtained
improperly, it is for the legislature to correct it by repealing
it; but so long as it exists as law, the Courts are bound to
obey it." 5 Thus, an act cannot be impeached on the ground
that its passage was procured by fraud.6 Of course, as the
assent of King, Lords and Commons is essential to constitute an act of Parliament, except in the instances provided for in the Parliament Act of I9II, 7 the absence of
the assent of one of these constituent branches of the legislature will prevent a bill from ever taking effect as a statute.
Such was the case in 1488 when a bill of attainder was assented to by King and Lords, but not the Commons. All
the Judges held it was not an act. 8 But an act duly assented
to and enrolled in the records of Parliament and in Chancery, it may safely be asserted, would be held conclusive
by the courts which would refuse to examine the journals
of either house to see whether the act had been passed in
accordance with accepted legislative rules. Such was the
conclusion of the chancellor and judges in the case of the
King v. Arundel 9 in i616, where it was held that the journals of Parliament could not destroy or weaken an act which
"being a high record could be tried only by itself." But
if the record of the act "carry its death wounds in itself,"
then it was true that the "parchment, no, nor the great seal
will not serve." As put by Lord Campbell in a modem
City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 669 (1700).
Lee v. Bude & T. J. R. Co.; L. R. 6 C. P. 576 (1871).
6Stead v. Carey, i C. B. 496 (1845); Waterford Ry. Co. v. Logan, i4
Q. B. 672 (i85o); Labrador Co. v. Green, (1893) A. C. 1o4; London & C. L.
I. A. Co. v. Rural Municipality of Morris, 7 Manitoba 128 (189o); Sunbury &
E. R. R. Co. v. Cooper, 33 Pa. 278 (1859); Carr v. Coke, II6 N. N. 223 (1895).
7 i & 2 Geo. v. Ch. 13.
8 y. B. 4 Hen. VII, I8. See also the Prince's Case, 8 Co. 28 (1605); College of Phisitians v. Cooper, 3 Keb. 587 (1675).
4

9 Hobart 1o9, Case 132 (1616).
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case: "All that a court of justice can do is to look to the
Parliamentary roll; if from that it should appear that a
bill has passed both houses and received the royal assent,
no court of justice can inquire into the mode in which it
was introduced into Parliament, nor into what was done previous to its introduction, or what passed in Parliament during
its progress in its various stages through both houses." 10
In the United States the conflict of opinion on this
subject is due to divergent views as to the functions of the
courts in acting as a check upon the legislatures, under the
prevalent constitutional system. Fundamentally the question is one of evidence as has been learnedly pointed out."
The enrolled act is but a solemn certificate of the enactment of the law by the legislature, the legislative journals
are but official statements of what passed in the respective
houses. Whether the enrolled act shall be conclusive as
against the journals is merely a question as to whether an
official statement of one character shall prevail as against
another of less dignity. But in most instances the discussion has taken 'a broader range and is concerned largely
with the problem whether or not it is the duty of the courts
to go behind the enrollment and pass-upon the validity ofan act, as. tested by the proceedings on its passage, when
the legislative procedure is prescribed by the constitution.
Not until the middle of the nineteenth century was
the issue fairly presented; other and more pressing problems had the right of way. The power of the courts to
pass on the constitutionality of legislation had to be established; the power of the legislatures to interfere with the
judgments of courts denied. Out of the struggle the courts
emerged supreme, in fact as well as name, and the victory
was reassuring to those who viewed with anxiety the steady
deterioration in public morality that accompanied and. succeeded the Jacksonian era. As legislators became less trustworthy, more and more it became the custom to hedge
10

Edenburgh & D. R. Co. v. Wanchope, 8 Cl. & F.
also Bradlaugh v. Gossett, (1884) 12 Q. B. D. 271.
21Wigmor.e on Evidence, sec. 135o.

710 (1842).

See
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them about with constitutional restrictions which applied
not only to the form and content of legislation but to the
practice and methods of legislative bodies as well; and, by
way of vicious circle no doubt, the mechanical safeguards
upon political action led to a false feeling of security and
a less careful choice of representatives. The state constitutions in force at the adoption of the constitution of
the United States" do not contain the elaborate checks upon
legislative procedure to be found in the constitutions of
today, but the rudiments of some of these well known restrictions were present. In New Hampshire and Pennsylvania, for example, the journals were to be published and,
on motion, the yeas and nays taken; in Georgia all laws
were to be three times read, each reading to be on different
and separate days, except in cases of great necessity and
danger. But as the various constitutions underwent revision these restrictive clauses were strengthened and enlarged, although it was some time before their-effect came
to be felt in judicial decisions.
As might well be suspected, the journal entry heresy
had its origin in New York in the days when the State Senate constituted the Court of Errors. In Warner v. Beers, 3
the general banking law of 1838 was sustained although it
was denied that it had received the assent of two-thirds of
the members of the legislature as the constitution required
in the case of acts creating altering or renewing corporations. The chancellor expressed his doubt as to whether
a court could institute an inquiry into the mode in which
a law was passed which was signed by the governor, and
duly certified by the Secretary of State. Senator Verplanck,
however, could not see why the courts were not bound to
receive as the conclusive legal evidence for public legislative
acts the official journals required to be kept by law. A
similar question arose in Purdy v. People,14 where the quesU The Constitutions of the Several States (1785).
Sec. 5, cl. 3 of the Constitution of the United States.
13 23 Wend.
142 Hill 31

io3 (x840).

See also Article I,

(N. Y. 1841); Purdy v. People, 4 Hill 384 (N. Y. 1842). See
also De Bon v. People, i Den. 9 (N. Y. 5845) overruled in Gifford v. Livingston,
2 Den. 38o (N. Y. 1845).
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ton was whether an act of 184o excluding aldermen of the
city of New York from sitting in the court of general sessions was within the constitutional provision requiring the
assent of two-thirds of the members of the legislature. The
principal point in dispute was whether the act was of the
character that required a two-thirds vote. The attorney
general conceded, that the act was not passed by the votes
of two-thirds of the members, but there was considerable
discussion of the difficulties involved in an inquiry into the
validity of an act. Mr. Justice Bronson, in the Supreme
Court, did not venture beyond suggesting that the court
must, when called on to do so, go behind the "printed statute
book." In the Court of Errors Chancellor Walworth thought
that the certificates of the presiding officers in the House
should be considered the legal evidence that the act had
received the required assent. No exception can be taken to
these views, as they do not carry the inquiry back of the
enrolled bill. But Senators Paige and Franklin referred to
the journals of the Senate and Assembly as evidence of the
manner in which the act was passed. Strictly speaking,
these cases do not stand for the broad principles for which
they have been cited in other jurisdictions but the dicta
they contained looked in the direction of greater control
over legislative action. "We live," said Mr. Justice Bronson, "under a government of laws, reaching as well to the
legislative as to the other branches of the government;
and if we wish to uphold and perpetuate free institutions,
we must maintain a vigilant watch against all encroachments of power, whether arising from mistake or design,
and from whatever source they may proceed." Twenty
years later the orthodox view was upheld by the Court of
Appeals in People v. Develinis and New York is now counted
among the States that will not permit a duly enrolled statute
to be impeached by the journals.
1533 N. Y. 269 (1865). See also People v. Purdy, 54 N. Y. 276 (1873);
Helm v. Day, 134 N. Y. 770 (1912). In Matter of N. Y. I. L. Bridge Co., 148
N. Y. 540 (1896) the journals were looked at to supplement the certificates of
the presiding officers. Accord, Matter of Stickney, 185 N. Y. 107 (19o6). The
certificates of the presiding officers are now conclusive by law, 4 Consolidated
Laws N. Y. (1917) P. 4741; Laws 19G9, ch. 37, § 40.
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With the turn of the half century a rapid succession of
cases disclosed the divergent views entertained toward the
problem. In 1849 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, two judges doubting, refused to go behind the
revised statutes to inquire into the proceedings of the
committee on revision.16

But in Spangler v. Jacoby,17 the

Supreme Court of Illinois, in 1853, declared that it was
clearly competent to show from the journals of either branch
of the legislature, that a particular act was not passed in
the mode prescribed by the Constitution, and thus defeat
its operation altogether. As the first clear and unequivocal
adoption of the journal entry rule the case is entitled to be
regarded as the leading one on that side of the argument.
The bill in question was signed by the speakers of both
houses and by the governor, but the journal of the House
of Representatives failed to show that it was ever put on
-final passage in that house and the Constitution required
that on the final passage of all bills, the vote should be by
ayes and noes, and should be entered on the journal. The
act was held null and void. The journal, said Chief Justice Treat, "is the evidence of the action of the house, and
by it the act must stand or fall. It certainly was not the
intention of the framers of the Constitution, that the signatures of the speakers and the executive should furnish
conclusive evidence of the passage of a law." The presumption, the court went on to say, was that an act so verified was law, but when the journal failed to show that the
act was passed in the mode prescribed by the Constitution
the presumption was overcome. This is an extreme view,
in a number of states accepting the journal entry rule the
silence of the journals raises no presumption against the
validity of the act.'8 But the precedent set in such an
important jurisdiction has had, no doubt, great influence
in establishing the general doctrine it favors. In the 1857
Eld. v. Gorham, 20 Conn. 8 (1849).
14 Ill. 297 (1853). -Accord, Turley v. Logan County, i7 Ill. 152 (1855).
's State v. Peterson, 38 Minn. 143 (1888); Chesney v. Clintock, 61 Kan.
In re Drainage Dist., 26 Idaho
94 (x899); State v. Frank, 6o Neb, 327 (900).
16
1

31I (1914).
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edition of his work on Statutory construction, Sedgwick
stated that it would seem that the journals might be consulted, 19 and in 1858 Minnesota and New Hampshire took
that ground.20
On the other hand, the contrary doctrine was maintained
in decisions rendered in 1856 in Mississippi and Missouri.
In Green v. Weller 21 after a very full argument the majority
of the Court refused to follow the dicta in Purdy v. People,
the courts, said Mr. Justice Handy, have no more power
to transcend their jurisdiction, than has the legislative
department of the government. Chief Justice Smith vigor,ously dissented.
In Pacific Railroad v. The Governor,22 it was held that
the certificates of the presiding officers of the two -Houses
of Assembly that a statute had passed by a constitutional
majority could not be impeached by the journals showing
a departure from the forms prescribed by the Constitution.
The question said the court, whether a law on its face violates the Constitution, is very different from that growing
out of non-compliance with the forms required in its enactment. To go behind the law would be an inquisition into
the conduct of the general assembly the frequent exercise
of which would lead to endless confusion. Some twenty
years later Missouri reversed its position on-this point following what was then the current of authority and attempting to distinguish the earlier case on the ground that changes
had been made in the constitution since it was rendered.23
Strong support to the enrolled bill theory was given
in the next decade by the California case of Sherman v.
Story s4 and the Indiana case of Evans v. Browne,25 in each
instance overruling prior decisions. Of the same period is
Pangborn v. Young 26 in the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
'9 Sedgwick on Statutory Construction (i ed.). Chap. 4of the Justices, 35 N. H. 579 (1858); Board of Supervisors of
Ramsey Co. v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 330 (1858).
2132 Miss. 65o (x856). Accord Ex parte Wren, 63 Miss. 512 (1886).
2223 Mo. 353 (1856) distinguishing State v. McBride, 4 Mo. 23 (1836).
2 State v. Mead, 71 Mo. 266 (879).
243o Cal. 253 (1866) overruling Fowler v. Pierce, 2 Cal. 165 (1852).
25,3o Ind. 514 (x869) overruling Skinner v. Deming, 2 Jud. 558 (5851).
26,32 N. J. L. 29 (1866).
20 Opinion
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sometimes cited as the leading case on this side; a position
due to the learned and convincing opinion of Chief Justice
Beasley in which the principles involved are traced back tothe year books. He calls attention to the careless way the
journals are kept and observes that if the laws are to be
tested by a comparison with the journals the stability of
all written law will be shaken to its foundations. The
journal moreover would be no check on the actions of those
who keep it when a violation was intentional. To the argument that the legislature might wilfully infringe constitutional prescriptions the answer was that "the judicial and
legislative departments are made co-equal, and that it nowhere appears that one has the right of supervision over
the other." Cogent as the reasoning of the court was, it
did not accord with public feeling at the time. Even the
legislature of New Jersey seemed unwilling to assume full
responsibility for its acts, for in 1873 an act was passed
providing that the Supreme Court, on petition of the attorney general or two or more citizens setting forth their reasons
for believing an act was not duly passed as required by the
Constitution, was empowered to inquire in a summary way
into the circumstances and if satisfied that the law was
not duly and constitutionally passed, to decree the same or
any part thereof null and void.27 Such a law indicates the
high water mark of judicial power. That it has been tactfully administered by the court in the spirit of Pangborn v.
Young2s does not detract from its significance.

It was a

period of low political morality when legislatures were distrusted and the courts looked upon by the public as the
sole guardians of the Constitution. This point of view is
reflected in the decisions. While in theory the legislative
and judicial departments are co-equal it does not follow, it
is said in a case upholding the journal entry rule, that the
latter may not declare an act invalid which has been unconstitutionally passed. "Certainly the supreme power-the
21Act of March 3, 1873, P. L. 27, Comp. Stat., p. 4978.

28See In re low, 88 N. J. L. 28 (i915).

PYLKINGTON'S CASE AND ITS SUCCESSORS

people-have the right to impose limitations upon the power
of either; and no one will deny that the people, speaking
through their fundamental law, may declare what shall be
a prerequisite to a legislative act. If such power exists
there must be some tribunal which has the right to determine whether the mandate of the constitution has been
obeyed. Under our system of government where can such
power be lodged except in the courts? If not there it is
nowhere; and it necessarily follows that the legislature is
above the law, greater than its creator, and the Constitution a vain and useless thing in so far as it seeks to impose
restrictions upon the legislative department."29 "A bill,"
said Chief Justice Cooley, "considered in the legislature,
but not constitutionally passed, can never become a law
by its being signed by the Governor and published with the
statutes. That is too plain a proposition to need argument
or illustration." That Judge Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations,1 adhered to the journal entry rule,
was a factor in producing that strong general tendency
toward its adoption Nyhich long prevailed and was only
checked in 189i by the decision in Field v. Clark.32
The Supreme Court of the United States for a long time
bad no opportunity to pass on this controverted question.
In Gardner v. The Collector,3- it was held that whenever a
question arose of the existence of a statute or the time when
it took effect, which in this case was the point involved,
as the enrolled act contained no other date of the president's
approval than the day of the month, the court had liberty
to resort to any source of infoimation including the journals.
South Altoona v. Perkins was decided on Illinois law.34
9 Rash v. Allen, i Boyce 444 (Del. i9io). See also People v. Mvlehaney,

13 Mich. 481 (1865); Jones v. Hutchinson, 43 Ala. 721 (1868); Union Bank v.

Commissioners,
119 N. C. 214 (1896).
30
Attorney General v. Joy, 55 Mich. 94 (1884).
31Colley's Constitutional Limitations (6 ed.) 162. A number of cases
rely on a quotation from this work alone.
2 143 U. S. 649 (189).
3 6 Wall. 497 (U. S. 1867).
94 U. S. 260 (1876). Followed Wilkes Co. v. Coles, 18o U. S. 506
(19oo); School District v. Chapman, 152 Fed. 887 (1907); United States v.
Andem, 158 Fed. 996 (i9o8); Burlingham v. Neubern, 23 Fed. 1014 (1914).
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In Field v. Clark 35 suits were brought by importers to obtain

a return of duties claimed to have been illegally exacted
under the tariff act of 189o.36 The enrolled act was attested
by the Speaker of the House and the Vice President and
approved by the President, but it was alleged that the
record of the proceedings in Congress showed that a section
of the bill as finally passed was not in the enrolled act. Mr.
Justice Harlan who delivered the opinion of the majority
of the court, said that the respect due to co-equal and
independent departments of the government requIred the
court to accept as authentic bills which carriep on their
face the solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments that they were duly passed. The evils resulting from the recognition of such a principle would be far
less than those that would result from a rule making the
validity of enactments depend upon the manner in which
the journals of the respective houses were kept. To what
extent the validity of legislation might be affected by a failure to enter on the journal those matters expressly required
to be entered by the constitution was unfortunately, and
it would seem unnecessarily, left undecided, 37 but the broad
doctrine announced in Field v. Clark has been repeatedly
approved in the Federal courts, 38 and may be said to have
turned the tide of opinion in favor of the enrolled act rule
in a number of jurisdictions where the point was still unsettled.
It would unduly prolong the discussion to take up in
detail the law of the various states. The cases have been
collected and are easily accessible. 39 In Ritzman v. Camp35 143 U. S. 649 (89).
3 Act of Oct. I, 1890, 26 Stat. at L. 567, c. 1244.
37See further United States v. Ballin, I44 U. S. I (1892); Hubbard v.
Lowe, 226 Fed. 135 (1915).
8 Lyons v. Woods, 153 U. S. 649 (1894); Harwood v. Wentworth, 162

U. S. 547 (1896); Twin City Bank v. Neveker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 (910).
19 See Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 2, sec. 1350; Sutherland on Statutory
Construction, Chap. 2; 4o L. R. A. N. S. i note, 9 Ann. Ca. 579 note, 20 Ann.
Ca. 343; 47 Amer. St. Rep. 801, 26 Amer. & Engl. Enc. of L. (2 ed.) 555, 36 Cyc.
1244. For Pennsylvania see Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 4o (1877); Comm. v.
Martin, 107 Pa. r85 (1884).
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bell 0 the Supreme Court of Ohio has attempted a classification of the jurisdictions, finding that the enrolled bill
-controls in "the United States, California, Connecticut,
Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Montana,
Georgia, Kentucky, Utah, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas,
North Dakota and South Dakota," while the journals control in "Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois,
Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming." This
arrangement represents the tendencies rather than the exact
shades of opinion in these states and contains some errors.
In Washington, for example, which is classed with the journal entry states, the enrolled bill has been held to control
in one of the best reasoned opinions on this subject, 41 while
the enrolled bill doctrine credited to North Carolina is there
qualified by exceptions.42 The Ohio Court gave it as their
rule that they would consult the journals to ascertain whether
the act had received a constitutional majority but would
not inspect the journals for the purpose of establishing a
discrepancy between the enrolled bill and the bill as it might
appear from the journals. The court finds no cases in
Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, New Mexico, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island and Vermont. In Idaho, however, the journal entry rule is followed,43 and the same principle has re44
cently been accepted in Delaware by a divided court.
In New Mexico, on the other hand, the enrolled bill rule has
been adopted. 45 Recent cases in other jurisdictions do not
indicate any decided change of view although there are
many fine distinctions taken which merely emphasize the
Ohio St. 246 (x915).
"1State v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452 (1893).
42 Compare Carr. v. Coke, II6 N. C. 223 (1895) uith Union Bank v. Oxford, I19 N. C. 214 (1896); Salem v. Wachovia L. & T. Co., i43 N. C. iO (x9o6);
Packing Co., 135 N. C. 62 (1904).
43 Cohn v. Kingsley, 5 Idaho 416 (1897); In re Drainage Dist., 26 Idaho
311 (1914).
44 Rash. v. Allen, i Boyce 444 (Del. i9io).
45 Kelly v. Marron, 21 N. M. 239 (915); State v. Hall, 23 N. M. 422
40 93

(0917).
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difficulty of maintaining an intermediate position. 4" It is.
interesting to find references to Pylkington's case in several
American decisions including Weeks v. Smith 4' in Maineas late as 1889. So precedents may survive.
The confusion in which the subject is involved is increased by the fact that many states have changed the rulemore than once and in several instances where the judges
have felt bound by precedent they have expressed their
preference for the rule not adopted in their state. But
is the extent of the controversy warranted by its intrinsic
difficulty? It would not seem so. The argument that the
enrolled bill rule invites fraud in the passage and certification of acts is answered by the fact that the opportunities.
for committing fraud will be far greater if the journals are
allowed to control the act. Aside from any question of
fraud it is well known that legislative journals are hastily
and sometimes carelessly prepared, and to make them the
ultimate test of validity offers new opportunities for the
nullification of legislation honestly adopted. As Dean Wigmore puts it succintly, the court will be going as far wrong
in repudiating an act based on proper votes falsified in the
journal as it will be in upholding an act based on improper
votes falsified in the enrollment. As the parol testimony
of the members is not admitted to impeach an act it would
seem that the courts have fixed an arbitrary limit to their
duty in getting at the facts regarding legislative obedience
to constitutional mandates. The basis of the doctrine would
seem to be that the courts are bound to enforce mandatory
constitutional provisions as to legislation. But no court
"6Compare, purporting to support the enrolled bill doctrine, Parkinson v.

Johnson, 16o Cal. 756 (1911); DeLoach v. Newton, 134 Ga. 739 (1910); State v.
Lynch, 169 Iowa 148 (i915); Vogt v. Beauchamp, 153 Ky. 64 (1913); Atchison
T. & S. R. Co., 28 Okla. 94 (I9i); State v. Sawyer, 104 S. C. 342 (1916); Kra-

poski v. Waskey, 33 S. D. 335 (x9x4); Home Tel. Co. v. Nashville, 118 Tenn. 1
(19o6); Harris Co. v. Hammond, 203 S. W. 445 (Tex. 1918) with Butler v. Directors, 99 Ark. 100 (1912); Denver v. Rubridge, 51 Colo. 224 (igiX); People v.
Leddy, 53 Colo. 109 (1912); Amos v. Moseley, 77 So. 619 (Fla. 1917); Worthy v.
Bush, 262 Ill. 56o (1914); Ridgely v. Baltimore, ii19 Md. 567 (1913); Jessup v.
Baltimore,

121

Md. 562 (x913); In re Opinion of Justices, 76 N. H. 6oi (19x);

Anderson v. Bowen, 77 W. Va. 89 (1916) contra; Woolfolk v. Albrecht,
36 (19xi) question undecided.
47

81 Me. 538 (889).
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-has suggested any adequate test to determine which con•stitutional regulations of legislative action are mandatory
and which permissive. The distinctions that have been
attempted are arbitrary and unconvincing. After all, as a
:practical matter, is it not well known that there are many
provisions in the various constitutions, relating both to the
executive and legislative departments, that the courts have
never thought of undertaking to enforce? The traditional
theory of our government is that each of the three departinents-the executive, the legislative and the judiciaryare equal and each responsible to the people that it represents and not to the other departments of the government. The journal entry doctrine is based on a false theory.
It assumes that the provisions of the constitutions relating
to legislation have been placed under the guardianship of
the courts rather than the legislatures which, presumably,
are without sufficient integrity to insure the preservation
of the constitutions. The true solution lies in a greater
-sense of responsibility on the part of the electors in the
choice of competent and honest legislators rather than in
building up mechanical checks upon their conduct, the
supervision of which is left to the judiciary in violation of
its true functions.
Looked at historically, this great group of conflicting
cases is extremely interesting as presenting most distinctly
one characteristic phase of American constitutional thought.
In spite of our tripartite system of government, there lies
-deep in the minds of many a craving for unity of power; for
undivided authority. Sovereignty must be monistic, not
pluralistic. Such a state of feeling, natural enough when
the commoner tendencies of philosophic thought are considered, tends from time to time to exalt now one, now
.another of the co-6rdinate branches of the Government.
In the twentieth century, it would seem, the tendency has
been to extend the executive power. The journal entry
doctrine was the product of that exaltation of the judicial
power characteristic of the middle and late nineteenth cen-
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tury. The halo of the great Marshall illuminated many a.
mediocre bench, while the misdeeds of legislators were very
real. In playing their part in this movement the courts.
were not conscious of exceeding their powers. On the contrary they believed, like the public, that they were the only
bulwarks against political immorality. The tide turned,
and the opening years of the twentieth century found public
opinion adverse to the extension of the powers of the courts,
through constitutional assumptions, and the courts to a
large extent have consciously or unconsciously brought their
methods into accord with public opinion. Had the question of going back of the enrolled bill to the legislative journals been postponed until today, the judges would probablyecho the words of Mr. Justice Markham in Pylkington's.
case: "Verament ceo est paryllous chose."
Win. H. Lloyd.
University of Pennsylvania Law School.

